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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GAYLE BABBITT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
7-ELEVEN SALES CORPORATION dba 
7-ELEVEN FOOD STORES 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Third 
District Court granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Appellant's appeal was originally filed in the Utah Supreme 
Court, however, it was subsequently assigned to the Utah Court of 
Appeals and assigned appellants' new case number of 981755-CA. 
This court has jurisdiction to consider the appellant's appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annot. § 78-2-2(3)(j) and Utah App. Proc. 
R. 3. This court has jurisdiction to review a final decision 
entered by a district court of the State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment 
Case No. 981755-CA 
Priority No. 15 
1 
where a material issue of fact existed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review to be applied in this case is 
contained in Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P. The standard is 
whether the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Since a summary judgment addresses only questions of law, 
the decision of the trial court is reviewed for correctness and 
accorded no deference. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 
839, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
A timely notice of appeal was filed in this case on November 
6, 1998. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND APPLICABLE RULES 
This case is governed by Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third district 
Court granting Summary Judgment to Defendant. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
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This is an appeal from the granting of Summary Judgment by 
the Honorable Anne M. Stirba which was appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court and then sent to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1. Plaintiff Babbitt fell on a mayonnaise package which was 
on the handicap ramp at a 7-11 store located at approximately 
2100 South and State Street in Salt Lake City, on June 19, 1996 
and fractured her hip. 
2. That Plaintiff has lived across the street trom that 7-
11 store since approximately January of 1994 up until the present 
time. 
3. That Plaintiff spoke with an employee/agent of 7/11 on 
the date of the accident by the name of Donna. 
4. That this employee/agent of 7/11 stated that they only 
police the area at 2:00 a. m. in the morning. She stated that 
vwe can't get out there in the day time because we are always 
busy." Affidavit of Babbitt, R. at 67, 68. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A material issue of fact exists which should be determined 
at trial and not through a motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. WHETHER SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS MATTER 
The owner of a business is charged with the duty to use 
3 
reasonable care to maintain the floor of his establishment in a 
reasonably safe condition for his patrons. Schnuphase v. 
Storehouse Markets, 918 P.d. 476, 478 (1996). In outlining a 
store owner's duty the Utah Supreme Court identified two classes 
of negligence cases. 
The first case involves some unsafe condition of a temporary 
nature, such as a slippery substance on the floor and usually 
where it is not known how it got there. In this type of case 
fault is imputed to the Defendant when (A) he had knowledge of 
the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive 
knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that he 
should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, 
sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care 
he should have remedied it. Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 
918 P.d. 476 (1996). 
In the second type of case, negligence is based upon a 
showing that the store owner created the hazardous condition. 
The second class of classes involved some unsafe condition of a 
permanent nature, such as, in the structure of the building, or 
of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the 
manner of use, which was created or chosen by the Defendant, or 
for which he is responsible. In the circumstances, where the 
defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it, 
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he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of 
notice is necessary. Id. 
When determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any 
material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law, the Court is required to construe 
all facts liberally in favor of the party opposing the motion, 
and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of 
the non-moving party. Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.d. 405, 408 
(Utah App.1987). Further, because summary judgment presents only 
questions of law, no deference is given to the trial court's 
ruling and it is reviewed for correctness. Mumaord v. ITT 
Commercial Fin. Corp. , 848 P.d. 1041, 1043 (Utah Ct App.1993). 
Plaintiff is entitled to prevail on the second theory in 
that its agents created or were responsible for creating a 
dangerous condition. Their method of operation creates a 
situation wherein they sell small mayonnaise packets to be used 
in and around the store where it was reasonably foreseeable that 
the expected acts of third parties would create a dangerous 
condition. A once a day policing of the grounds is not 
sufficient to insure the floors and grounds are sufficiently 
clear of the self help packages of mayonnaise, mustard, and 
ketchup which might be discarded. These packages on the floor 
are inherently dangerous. A jury could find that defendant 
5 
should have been more vigilant in finding and removing the 
expected slippery litter left behind by the customers. 
This case is similar to Canfield v. Albertson, Inc., 841 
P.d. 1224 (Utah.Ct.App. 1992) In Canfield, Albertsons' created a 
temporary condition by placing empty boxes around a display of 
lettuce, expecting that customer would.discard some of the outer 
leaves in the empty boxes. The Plaintiff slipped on a leaf which 
had fallen or which a customer had dropped on the floor the Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
on the grounds that there was a material issue of fact involving 
the question of whether Albersons took reasonable precautions to 
protect its customers from the condition it created. 
As in Canfield, Defendant could foresee that when they sell 
take out items which are eaten on the premises which could 
include all types of various food items that food items would 
regularly fall to the floor and create the hazard of a slip and 
fall. The total lack of monitoring is a breach of the 
appropriate duty. The Defendant regularly maintains trash 
recepticals around the 7/11 store for customers to discard the 
packets of mayonnaise when used, therefore the Defendant knew of 
the potential hazard by placing the trash recepticals around the 
store for the customers use. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's granting of Summary Judgment for 
Defendant, was error, as a material issue of fact exists as a 
hazardous situation was allowed to exist by the Defendant. 
DATED this day of June 14, 1999, 
David Grindstaff 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAYLE BABBITT, 
PJ aintiff, 
vs . 
7-ELEVEN SALES CORPORATION dba 
7-ELEVEN FOOD STORES 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 970901995PI 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
October 7, 1998 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Specifically, 
on May 21, 1998, defendant, Southland Corporation, improperly 
identified in Plaintiff's Complaint as 7-Eleven Sales Corporation 
dba 7-Eleven Food Stores Corporation, filed their "Motion for 
Summary Judgment." On June 5, 1998, plaintiff filed "Plaintiff's 
Memorandum m Opposition to Defendant' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment." Also on June 5, 1998, plaintiff fa led "Plaintiff's 
Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment." On June 3 5, 1998, defendant filed "Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment." On August 27, 1998, the matter was 
submitted for decision. Neither party requested oral argument. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, affidavit, 
BABBITT v. 7-ELEVEN PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
and for the good cause that has been shown hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
This negligence action comes before the Court the result of an 
accident in which plaintiff contends that as she was walking up a 
handicap ramp, entering into the defendant store, she slipped and 
fell on a mayonnaise packet a]legedly on the ramp. 
With this motion, defendant seeks summary judgment against 
plaintiff asserting her claim is invalid as (1) she has failed to 
offer evidence that defendant, or its employees, had either actual 
or constructive knowledge of the condition; and (2) that after such 
knowledge, sufficient time had elapsed that in the exercise of 
reasonable care, defendant should have remedied it. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing the affidavit she 
submitted in opposition raises a disputed issue of material fact. 
Specifically, notes plaintiff, in her affidavit she states that a 
store employee admitted that because the employees are so busy, 
they are unable to poJice the business for potential problems 
except at 2:00 a.m. In this case asserts plaintiff, the store 
created a hazardous condition by selling mayonnaise containers to 
be eaten on the premises and yet, failed to take any steps to 
remove fallen material when dropped, except at 2:00 a.m. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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"In considering a summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate 
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment." Cinder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 7 39 P. 2d 
634, 634 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In outlining a store owner's duty of reasonable care in slip 
and fall cases, the Utah Supreme Court identified two classes of 
negligence cases. In the first class, a store owner must have 
either actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition, 
specifically: 
The first [class] involves some unsafe 
condition of a temporary nature, such as a 
slippery substance on the floor and usually 
where it is not known how it got there. In 
this class of cases it is quite universally 
held that fault cannot be imputed to the 
defendant so that liability results therefrom 
unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had 
knowledge of the condition, that is, either 
actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge 
because the condition had existed long enough 
that he should have discovered it; and (B) 
that after such knowledge, sufficient time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable 
care he should have remedied it. 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (quoting Allen 
v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)). 
With respect to the second class, the Court stated the 
following: 
The second class of cases involves some unsafe 
condition of a permanent nature, such as: in 
the structure of the building, or of a 
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stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, 
or in the manner of use, which was created or 
chosen by the defendant (or his agents), or 
for which he is responsible. In such 
circumstances, where the defendant either 
created the condition, or is responsible for 
it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and 
no further proof of notice is necessary. 
Id. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's allegations center around an 
unsafe condition of a temporary nature, therefore, plaintiff must 
demonstrate (1) that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge 
of the condition; and (2) that after such knowledge, defendant had 
a reasonable amount of time to remedy it. 
To satisfy these requirements, plaintiff has submitted her 
affidavit in which she states she spoke with an employee of 
defendant who stated they don't police the area until 2:00 a.m. 
There is nothing in plaintiff's affidavit, however, which indicates 
defendant knew of the condition or had a reasonable time after 
learning of the condition to fix the problem. Indeed, the only 
evidence regarding time is plaintiff's deposition in which she 
states she figured the packet "had only been there, you know, a 
short time. . .,." (Babbitt Deposition, page 35, lines 6-18). 
In further support of her position, plaintiff cites the case 
of Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In Canfield, Albertsons created a temporary condition by placing 
boxes around a "farmer's pack" display of lettuce, expecting that 
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customers would discard some of the outer leaves in the empty 
boxes, id. at 1225. The plaintiff in Canfield, slipped on a leaf 
which had fallen on the floor. The court of appeals reversed the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment on the ground "there was a 
material issue of fact involving the question of whether Albertsons 
took reasonable precautions to protect its customers from the 
dangerous condition it created." id. at 1227. 
While on its face Canfield appears instructive, a closer 
reading of the case indicates it is factually distinguishable. 
Indeed, central to the court of appeal's finding in Canfield was 
the determination that Albertsons had notice of the potentially 
hazardous condition as evidenced by the store's placement of empty 
boxes and its instituting a regular schedule for inspecting and 
cleaning the produce section. In the instant case, no similar 
evidence has been offered by the plaintiff. 
While most cases involving claims of negligence are not 
susceptible to a summary judgment ruling, where the evidence Mis 
free from doubt so that all reasonable [persons] would come to the 
same conclusion," summary disposition is appropriate. Anderson v. 
Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Utah 1993)/ accord Preston v. 
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1968). In the case 
at bar, plaintiff has merely made "bare contentions, unsupported by 
any specification of facts in support thereof, [which] raise no 
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material question of fact as will preclude the entry of summary 
judgment." Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 
1980) . 
Based upon the aforementioned, defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
This Memorandum Decision constitutes the order regarding the 
matters addressed hecein. No further order is required, 
lis / day DATED th: of October, 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
f€^\ ANNE M. STIRBA 
